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Community realm. Read the code first. Community realm, deployed by its author. Read the code before you interact or send coins.

raffle/v2 package

Overview

Package raffle is the SPLASH weekly ticket raffle.

WHAT THIS REPLACES, AND WHY IT IS A SEPARATE REALM.

r/splash/game is a permanent-deposit yield product: you deposit GNOT, you can never withdraw, your position size IS your ticket count, and winning the weekly draw ADDS the pot to your locked position rather than paying your wallet. Its raffle had to live inside that realm because the draw mutated three pieces of that realm's state atomically (see the long comment at the top of r/splash/game/raffle.gno).

This realm sells TICKETS, not positions. A ticket costs TicketPrice and buys exactly unitsPerTicket units of one week's draw — one ticket was one unit until 2026-09-29, and EntryUnitPrice says why the two numbers had to come apart; the pot pays out to the winner's WALLET; and nothing a buyer paid is held beyond the week they bought into. Because there is no position, no yield index and no permanent deposit, the draw needs nothing from r/splash/game and this realm holds no authority over it, over r/splash/beacon, or over r/gnoland/wugnot.

THERE IS EXACTLY ONE PACKAGE-PATH GUARD IN THIS FILE, AND UNTIL 2026-09-29 THERE WERE NONE. The sentence that used to be here — "there is no package-path guard anywhere in this file and nothing for one to protect" — is no longer true and is not quietly deleted. FundPotWithEntries admits r/splash/arcade/duel and nobody else, because duel play now EARNS entries in the live week's draw (AUDIT-2026-09-28.md finding 15). Read that function in full before touching it: it is the only privileged door in this product, it is the shape r/splash/game declined to add five times, and what keeps it small is that everything it can do is bounded by the money delivered through it in the same call. Every OTHER entry point here is still permissionless and can still only do the one thing the week's state machine allows next.

THE MECHANICS ARE r/splash/game/raffle.gno's, DELIBERATELY UNCHANGED: the week number derived from the global clock, the Commit/Capture/Resolve three-phase cycle, and above all the FROZEN-TOTAL property. Read Commit below before changing anything: freezing the ticket total is what stops a buyer from waiting for the randomness to publish and then buying exactly the winning ticket index, and that attack was live in an earlier version of the old realm.

ONE MECHANIC IS NOT THE OLD REALM'S ANY MORE: WHICH ROUND DECIDES A WEEK. The old realm — and this one until 2026-09-28 — bound Round = beacon.Latest() + 1 inside Commit, which handed the round choice to whoever called Commit, AFTER the week's ticket set was already frozen and public. The publisher's key can sign any round at will and beacon.Publish accepts rounds in any order, so that was a deterministic, risk-free win for the key holder. The round is now PINNED WHEN THE WEEK'S RECORD IS CREATED — before the first ticket of that week exists — and is never written again. See getOrCreateDraw and pinOffsetRounds.

THAT DOES NOT MAKE THE DRAW TRUSTLESS, and nothing in this file should be read as claiming it does. The beacon's key holder still knows every round's randomness in advance, so they can still rig a week by choosing the MODULUS — buying last, just before the week closes, to move FrozenTotal and the unit ranges. Pinning removes the round-selection freedom, which was the cheap, deniable and exact version of the attack; the residual one leaves an on-chain trace as a suspicious late purchase. THE ARCHITECTURAL PROBLEM REMAINS OPEN and is the owner's decision: closing it needs an externally-controlled beacon or a VRF. See AUDIT-2026-09-28.md findings 4 and 10.

THE ARCADE FEEDS THIS POT, AND SINCE 2026-09-29 IT ALSO FILLS THE DRAW. r/splash/arcade/duel sends its rake here, so every coin flip makes this week's prize bigger — that is what makes the duel and the raffle one product instead of two contracts. The rake itself still buys no tickets and no winning chance: it is tracked separately as Draw.Sponsored, because the refund safety property is the identity Pot == sum(spends) + Sponsored and house money belongs to no buyer. Read Draw.Sponsored and FundPot together before changing either.

WHAT CHANGED IS THAT THE PLAYERS WHO PAID THAT RAKE NOW ARRIVE WITH IT. Until 2026-09-29 the money came and the entrants did not, so a week of busy coin flipping and no ticket sales could be won outright by one cheap ticket bought in its final block — the whole pot, to somebody who had contributed none of it. FundPotWithEntries is the fix: the duel delivers the same rake and, in the same call, the two players of each settled duel are credited entries worth EXACTLY what that rake would have bought at EntryUnitPrice. The money and the entrants now arrive together. Earned entries carry ticket weight and NO spendOf record, which is consistent with every identity in this file and is spelled out at FundPotWithEntries. AUDIT-2026-09-28.md finding 15.

WHAT IS NEW, and could not have existed in the old design: Refund. There, the pot was accrued protocol fees and nobody's stake was ever at risk, so an unresolvable draw could simply wait forever. Here the pot is buyers' own money, so a week nobody settles must have a way back out. SINCE THE DRAND MIGRATION THAT IS A LIVENESS EXIT AND NOT A LOSS EXIT — no round is ever unobtainable, so what Refund guards against is nobody bothering to relay one. See Refund.

Function

Capture

func Capture(cur realm, week int64)
Ask AI Claude ChatGPT

Capture copies a committed week's beacon randomness into the draw.

IT IS NO LONGER A SAFETY MECHANISM, AND SAYING SO IS THE POINT OF THIS COMMENT. What it used to say: "the beacon keeps signatures for beacon.PruneWindow = 2016 rounds, about seven days at a five-minute cadence; this raffle is WEEKLY, so a draw settled late can find its round already pruned and the pot would have no way to name a winner. Capture preserves the value while it is still there." Every clause of that is now false. r/splash/beacon has no retention window and no Prune, drand serves every round for ever from at least three public relays, and Publish is permissionless — SO THERE IS NOTHING TO PRESERVE THE VALUE FROM. There is no capture window either; the old paragraph computed one, and it does not exist.

WHAT IT STILL DOES, which is why it is kept rather than removed:

  • it copies a public value into the draw's own state, so Resolve needs no beacon read later and the settled draw is self-contained;
  • it makes the value visible through CapturedRandomness and the Capture event before the week is settled, which a front end and an auditor can both use.

A CONVENIENCE, then. Removing it would delete an exported realm function and a large block of correct, tested behaviour in order to retire a comment; retiring the comment is enough. Nothing in this realm's safety now depends on anyone calling it — see resolvable()'s removal and Refund's gate.

PERMISSIONLESS, deliberately. Its only effect is to store a value that is already public — the round's randomness, readable by anyone the moment it is published. Gating it on an operator would buy nothing and would put a liveness dependency for the whole pot back onto one key.

WHAT IS STORED IS THE 64-CHARACTER HEX RANDOMNESS — sha256 of the signature, a hash, not the signature itself — and it is NOT re-verified here. The pairing check happened once already inside beacon.Publish on the way in; redoing it would be expensive duplicated work on an input that is already known good, and the beacon has no route by which a published round's randomness can change afterwards.

A SECOND Capture NEVER OVERWRITES THE FIRST, and is a silent no-op rather than a panic: two callers racing to perform a permissionless public good should not make one of them fail.

Capturing before the round is published PANICS. There is nothing to preserve yet, and storing anything else — least of all some already-published value — would hand the draw a randomness for a round nobody pinned, which is the exact attack the pin exists to prevent.

COMMIT DOES NOT CAPTURE, AND MUST NOT START. Since the round is pinned at record creation, a week's round may well be published by the time it is committed, so a capture there would often succeed — and it would put a beacon read back inside the one function whose job is to choose nothing. Capture staying separate and permissionless is what keeps the commit path free of any beacon dependency at all; see Commit's note on why there is no publication check there either.

Param

Command

# WARNING: This command is running in an INSECURE mode.
# It is strongly recommended to use a hardware device for signing
# and avoid trusting any computer connected to the internet,
# as your private keys could be exposed.

gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1r4aw43kagaaquhegxw6xr346h9f2qu2ezf0jar/arcade/raffle/v2" -func "Capture" -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -chainid "onyx-1" -remote "https://rpc.onyx.testnets.gno.land" ADDRESSgnokey query -remote "https://rpc.onyx.testnets.gno.land" auth/accounts/ADDRESS
gnokey maketx call -pkgpath "gno.land/r/g1r4aw43kagaaquhegxw6xr346h9f2qu2ezf0jar/arcade/raffle/v2" -func "Capture" -args $'' -gas-fee 1000000ugnot -gas-wanted 1_000_000_000 -send "" -broadcast=false ADDRESS > call.tx
gnokey sign -tx-path call.tx -chainid "onyx-1" -account-number ACCOUNTNUMBER -account-sequence SEQUENCENUMBER ADDRESS
gnokey broadcast -remote "https://rpc.onyx.testnets.gno.land" call.tx